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This Note applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the trade-offs
from permitting the assignability of personal injury tort claims and the sanctioning of markets
in such claims. I assess the trade-offs for three aspects of the tort system: compensation for
victims, deterrence of inefficient risk-taking, and judicial economy. I outline the mechanisms
through which assignability could affect these aspects and conclude that additional empirical
evidence is needed before the net effect of assignability on these aspects can be properly
quantified. Finally, I provide a rudimentary framework to guide the collection of the empirical
evidence needed to assess the net effect of assignability on these aspects.
INTRODUCTION
is controversial. Warfare, both academic and actual, has raged
over the marketization (or socialization) of nearly every aspect of human existence,2
or its entirety,3 for centuries.4 The assignability, and therefore marketization, of
personal injury tort claims has been a particularly volatile arena, with a spectrum of
policy approaches as diverse as the geographical and historical settings in which they
have been implemented. Critics have traditionally decried the maintenance of a
market for torts as inhumane, inefficient, and sinister.5 Beyond general skepticism
about the assignability of a personal chose in action,6 opponents of the marketization
of personal injury tort claims contend such a policy is uniquely noxious and would
be harmful to both tort victims and society as a whole.7 Proponents contend the
Marketization1

1. For the purposes of this Note, I adopt the definition of marketization as the act or process
of “entering into, participating in, or introducing a free market economy.” Marketization, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/marketization [ https://perma.cc/SKW8YSNG ] ( last visited June 11, 2019 ). For a contemporary discussion of marketization trends and their
relationship with the law, see Robin Paul Malloy, Law, Market, and Marketization, 1 U. OF BOLOGNA
L. REV. 166 (2016).
2. For an argument for the marketization of personal injury tort claims, see Isaac Marcushamer,
Selling Your Torts: Creating a Market for Tort Claims and Liability, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1543 (2005);
Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1297–1341
(2002). . For an argument for the socialization of such claims, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing
Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 642 (1985). For a similar argument for marketization
in the context of fraud claims, see Teal E. Luthy, Assigning Common Law Claims for Fraud, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1998).
3. See KARL Marx, CAPITAL VOLUME III: THE PROCESS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION AS A
WHOLE 248–49 (Friedrich Engels ed., 1894) (concluding the socialization of nearly every aspect of
economic production is inevitable).
4. For a discussion of the market for tort claims existing under Roman law and its eventual
prohibition in 506 A.D., see Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 65–66 (1935).
5. E.g., Huber v. Johnson, 68 Minn. 74, 78 (1897) (“The general purpose of the law against
champerty and maintenance was to prevent officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and
contention by vexatious or speculative litigation, which would disturb the peace of society, lead to
corrupt practices, and pervert the remedial processes.”).
6. See J.B. Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels. III. Inalienability of Choses in Action, 3
HARV. L. REV. 337, 337–46 (1890) (discussing the inalienability of choses in action and the historical
roots of the prohibition in English common law).
7. See Gammons v. Johnson, 76 Minn. 76, 80–81 (1899) (identifying a “systematic scheme to
hunt up claims” for profit as being a course of conduct so obnoxious to public policy that a worse
course of conduct “cannot be well imagined”).
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arguments marshalled against a market for personal injury tort claims are specious,
or at least resolvable through regulation.8 Proponents further identify a number
of social benefits from the implementation of a market for torts,
including: 1) increasing access to justice and compensation for tort victims;
2) encouraging efficient levels of risk-taking through effective deterrence; and
3) improving judicial economy.9 Opponents reply that any benefit derived from
marketization will be outweighed by the cost. Assessing the tradeoffs between
allowing or outlawing the assignment of personal injury tort claims is fundamentally
a question of institutional choice, requiring comparative institutional analysis.10 In
this Note, I survey the academic ordnance deployed in the struggle surrounding the
marketization of personal injury tort claims and conclude that there has been a
failure to adequately engage in comparative institutional analysis. I then apply the
comparative institutional analytic framework to the dynamics of participation
between individual tort victims represented by attorneys and hypothetical
commercial claim purchasers to reach some theoretical conclusions as to how the
agreed-upon goals of the tort system would be affected by allowing the assignability
of personal injury tort claims.11
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The notion that the just resolution of legal disputes ought to involve only the
litigants and a neutral arbiter has been commonplace and persistent in the
development of western legal thought.12 Suspicion about the involvement of
8. See Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329,
329–49 (1987) (arguing that potential issues in the implementation of a market for torts are resolvable
through regulation).
9. Id. (concluding the identified social benefits of a market for torts outweigh the cost).
10. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3–13 (1994) (defining the comparative institutional analytic
framework and explaining its importance); Gregory Shaffer, Comparative Institutional Analysis and a
New Legal Realism, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 607, 609–11, 625–28 (2013) (discussing Komesar’s comparative
institutional analytic framework and applying it to global governance). To properly assess tradeoffs, one
should address two issues in parallel: goal choice and institutional choice. Sergio Puig & Gregory
Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L
L. 361, 361 (2018). The commentators I discuss generally agree the goals served by the tort system are
1) compensation to victims, 2) deterrence of tortious conduct, and 3) minimizing the social cost of
administering the tort system (judicial economy).
11. “Before one can engage in any form of [comparative institutional analysis], one must define
. . . what is meant by an ‘institution.’” Daniel H. Cole, The Varieties of Comparative Institutional Analysis,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 383, 388 (2013). For this Note, I consider the following definition, first articulated
by Douglass North, to be the most useful in weighing the tradeoffs of allowing the assignability of
personal injury tort claims:
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human
exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way
societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change.
Id. at 389 (quoting DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990)).
12. See Radin, supra note 4, at 48.
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extrinsic parties in legal disputes can be traced to the ancient Athenians.13 The
ancient Athenians encountered many forms of legal interference or subversion, but
the most typical and most reviled was the supporting of claims against political or
economic competitors for extrinsic purposes. Athenian law referred to this
interference as sykophanteia, or sycophancy.14 Successfully prosecuting a claim in
ancient Athens afforded the prosecutor substantial political capital, and often
material reward. This led to manipulation of the system for political or personal
purposes.15 Suspicion of interference by extrinsic parties was carried on in the
Roman tradition, which legislated against calumnia, the Roman equivalent of
sykophanteia. The Roman law broadly defined calumnia16 to prohibit nearly all
activities considered to be perversions or manipulations of the justice system,
including what English law would later differentiate as maintenance, champerty, and
barratry.17 The prohibition on calumnia, like the Athenian approach to sykophanteia,
was meant to dissuade the subversion of the legal system for obnoxious purposes.
Notably, calumnia laws did not prohibit the sale of personal injury tort claims, prior
to the initiation of a lawsuit,18 until 506 A.D. when the profit incentive for the
buying of claims was removed by the constitution of Emperor Anastasius.19
In medieval Europe the Roman skepticism toward speculative forms of legal
interference persisted, flowing in part from its close association with the sin of
usury.20 This attitude was carried forward into the common law of England,
which explicitly prohibited maintenance, champerty, and barratry.21 English
jurists identified four primary purposes served by the prohibition of these

13. Id. at 49.
14. Sykophanteia refers to an Athenian legal concept and is unrelated to the modern English
word “sycophant.” Id. at 51.
15. While the Athenians viewed sykophanteia with distrust, Athenian law did not in fact prohibit
the transfer of all or part of a property interest in a claim since this gave the third party a real interest in
the dispute, rather than a purely extrinsic one, which mollified the Athenians primary concern. The
issues with marketization later identified by the Romans and English related to speculation and
litigiousness were not prevalent in ancient Athens. See id.
16. “Calumniators are 1) those who without authorization bring actions (in the name of
another) with which they have no concern, 2) those who after losing their suit by a just determination,
attempt to bring the action again, 3) those who seek or file claims in court for property, that does not
belong to them, 4) those who under the pretense of aiding the Treasury, plan to acquire the property
of other persons and do not suffer law-abiding citizens to be at peace, and 5) those who by bringing
false charges against an innocent person undertake to arouse the wrath of the governmental authority
against them. Such persons are all driven into exile.” Id. (quoting Codex Theodosianus 9, 39, 3.)
17. Id. at 53.
18. This distinguished early Roman law from ancient Athenian law, which allowed the transfer
of an interest in a claim at any time. Id. at 54.
19. Id. at 55. Under the new constitution, an assignee could only recover an amount equal to or
less than the consideration paid to the assignor for the claim. This change developed because of
complaints that plaintiffs were being induced to sell their claims for far below their true value.
20. Id. at 61.
21. “[P]ut simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a
suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance
or champerty.” In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978).
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activities: (1) discouraging speculation, which is thought to promote frivolous
litigation; (2) the personal nature relationship view of lawsuits;22 (3) protecting the
weaker parts of society from being abused through the legal system; and (4)
preventing the rich and powerful from using the legal system to satisfy personal
vendettas.23 This last purpose was a product of feudal institutions whereby the
nobility would engage in “private war” through legal mechanisms by giving material
support (maintenance) to their retainers in disputes with their political or economic
competitors without consideration of the merits of the dispute.24 The first three
arguments are frequently deployed against the assignability of personal injury claims
today.25
American jurists were quick to recognize the inapplicability of the English
rationale to their context.26 Either by statute or judicial decision, several jurisdictions
in the early United States began liberalizing the common law restrictions on
assignability.27 A diversity of approaches emerged and solidified across jurisdictions,
culminating in four basic approaches to the doctrine of maintenance and champerty
in American jurisprudence. These approaches are: (1) no recognition of laws
prohibiting maintenance and champerty; (2) only lawyers are subjected to laws
prohibiting maintenance and champerty; (3) some claims may be assigned, but
others may not; and (4) the full prohibition of maintenance and champerty is in
effect.28 Even jurisdictions that have taken the first approach have limited or
prevented the development of a market for personal injury tort claims. For example,
Texas has expressly permitted the assignment of tort claims since at least 1889,29
but barratry law forbids the solicitation of such claims.30 Other jurisdictions
permitting assignment of tort claims prevent the development of a market by
prohibiting the purchasing of tort claims by market participants.31 At least two
jurisdictions followed the Roman approach and restricted the ability of assignees to
22. See Ames, supra note 6, at 337–46.
23. See Marcushamer, supra note 2, at 1551.
24. Maintenance in England was a “means by which powerful men aggrandized their estates
and the background was unquestionably that of private war.” See Radin, supra note 4, at 64. Maintenance
in this manner is analogous to the sykophanteia and calumnia addressed by the Athenians and Romans
respectively.
25. English jurists at the time identified mitigating the threat of maintenance as the chief
purpose served by prohibiting the assignment of personal claims. See Lampet’s Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46,
48 (1613), for Lord Coke’s discussion of the purposes served by prohibiting the assignment of claims.
26. See Radin, supra note 4, at 68; see also Schomp v. Schenck, 40 N.J.L. 195, 202 (1878)
(concluding there was no prohibition of champerty in New Jersey because “the entire doctrine of
maintenance was the product of a state of society very different from that which now exists, or has ever
existed, in this state”).
27. See, e.g., THE CODE OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; FROM 1848 TO 1871,
at 77–78 (identifying assignees as real parties in interest with standing to bring a lawsuit as early as 1848).
28. See Marcushamer, supra note 2, at 1553–65, for a survey of how these four approaches
emerged in various jurisdictions.
29. See Mallios v. Baker, 11 S.W.3d 157, 172 (Tex. 2000) (Enoch, J., concurring).
30. See Barratry and Solicitation of Professional Employment, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12
(West 2013).
31. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. §§ 488–489 (McKinney 2006).
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recover more than the consideration paid to the tort victim, thereby eliminating the
profit incentive of a purchaser.32
THE CASE FOR MARKETIZATION
Modern proponents of the marketization of personal injury tort claims assert
a variety of beneficial effects would flow from establishing a market for torts. These
include increasing the amount of compensation tort victims receive, deterring
tortfeasors from inefficient risk-taking, and reducing burdens on the courts.
1.

Increased Compensation

The sharpest weapon in the proponents’ arsenal is the argument that
marketization of personal injury claims increases compensation for tort victims,
particularly those victims precluded from litigation in the status quo by economic
or informational constraints.33 The argument’s appeal is intuitive. Increasing the
ability of wrongfully injured parties to recover compensation from wrongdoers,
particularly those victims precluded from doing so in the status quo through no
fault of their own, clearly advances the interests of justice. Proponents contend
marketization of personal injury claims would affect the ability of tort victims to
recover compensation in two ways: (1) increasing the value of compensation tort
victims receive and (2) increasing tort victims’ access to compensation.34
The cornerstone of this contention is the different market positions occupied
by tort victims and claim purchasers in terms of risk aversion, time sensitivity, and
transaction costs. First, the tort victim is expected to be relatively more risk averse
than a commercial claim purchaser because individuals tend to be more risk averse
than commercial enterprises.35 The difference in risk aversion between businesses
and individuals places downward pressure on total compensation because it gives
tortfeasors (which are more commonly insured corporate entities than individuals)
greater bargaining power.36 Marketization levels the playing field.
Second, the tort victim does not have the luxury of time. Many tort victims
immediately need money to pay for medical bills, replace lost wages, and cover living
expenses. The tort victim who cannot afford the time required to acquire and
enforce a judgment against the tortfeasor will either be forced to settle the claim for
a reduced sum or forego the claim completely if the tortfeasor insists on litigating.37
32. See City of Detroit v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 28 Mich. Ct. App. 54 (1970); D’Angelo v. Cornell
Paperboard Prods. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 390 (1963).
33. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960), for an
explanation of how many welfare-maximizing reallocations are often forgone because of the transaction
costs involved in bargaining.
34. See Shukaitis, supra note 8, at 329–437.
35. See id. at 335 n.39 (citing H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 52 (1968)).
36. A bargaining situation between a risk-averse tort victim and a risk-neutral tortfeasor favors
the tortfeasor who can threaten the victim with the uncertainty of litigation. Id. at 336.
37. It may be helpful to conceptualize a settlement as the selling of the victim’s right to a
judgment against the tortfeasor. This illuminates the status quo as essentially equivalent to a

Final to Printer_Strickland (Do Not Delete)

2019]

THE MARKET FOR TORTS

7/22/2019 7:54 PM

1295

The tortfeasor, on the other hand, benefits directly from delay.38 The commercial
claim purchaser should have a reduced need for timely compensation, thereby
strengthening their bargaining position.
Third, tort victims face transaction costs that a commercial claim purchaser
can avoid or mitigate. For example, claim purchasers can hold a diversified portfolio
of claims. A diversified portfolio of claims is worth more than the sum of the
expected monetary value of the individual claims because diversification reduces
some of the risk associated with the claims.39
Another way transaction costs are lower for claim purchasers is that they
would have an advantage in valuing tort claims relative to tort victims. For example,
a purchaser might specialize in automobile accident claims or medical malpractice
claims in much the same way that law firms do today. The claim is more valuable
to the expert purchaser than to the tort victim because the purchaser’s knowledge
or experience allows her to value the claim more precisely and to recover a larger
judgment in court.40
A final way that purchasers could experience reduced transaction costs is
through economies of scale.41 A purchaser can invest in his or her own legal staff
to process claims rapidly and efficiently, thereby reducing the costs of litigating
claims. A purchaser of claims would also maintain an advantage over traditional law
firms, who are ethically obligated to fully represent the interest of every client, by
selectively pursing those claims which are more profitable or likely to succeed.42 To
summarize the effect on compensation, one proponent concludes that “the net
effect of a well-functioning market would be to raise the compensation received by

monopsonized market where the tortfeasor holds the exclusive right to purchase tort claims against
them. A monopsony provides the buyer with a significant advantage in bargaining power. See William
M. Boal & Michael R. Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 86, 86–112, 87–89
(1997), for an explanation of basic monopsony models.
38. To understand how tortfeasors are categorically benefitted by delay, imagine a tortfeasor
who will become subject to a $1,000,000 judgment in the future. By investing the money in the interim,
let’s say at a 10% interest rate for convenience, every month of delay saves the tortfeasor $8,333. See
DAVID R. HENDERSON, PRESENT VALUE, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008).
This incentive to delay also reduces the incentive for tortfeasors to settle until the entry of judgment
against them. Prejudgment interest is sometimes available, but it is hardly universal. Michael K. Brown,
The Availability of Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Cases, 16
U.S.F. L. REV. 325, 325–26 (1982); see also Bean v. Pacific Coast Elevator Corp., 234 Cal. App. 4th
1423, 1430–31 (2015) (holding plaintiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest for costs).
39. Shukaitis, supra note 8, at 336.
40. Id. at 337.
41. See Frederick T. Moore, Economies of Scale: Some Statistical Evidence, 73 Q. J. ECON. 232,
232–45 (1959) (explaining how economies of scale reduce the marginal cost of production).
42. An additional example of how claim purchasers would have an advantage over traditional
law firms can be seen in cases where there are many claims against a single defendant. An attorney
would be obligated to consider each claim individually and represent that individual claimant’s interest,
but a claim purchaser could negotiate with the defendant and settle a bundle of claims at a discount.
Essentially, such an arrangement would allow for the spontaneous formation of plaintiff classes based
on economic efficiency with minimal, if any, judicial involvement and would avoid the issues associated
with certification. See Marcushamer, supra note 2, at 1580.
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tort victims towards the expected value of a claim discounted at a market interest
rate appropriate for the riskiness of a diversified portfolio of personal injury tort
claims.”43
Beyond increasing the value of compensation to tort victims, proponents of
personal injury tort marketization contend doing so would allow tort victims
currently precluded from prosecuting their claim to receive compensation. Many
tort victims never receive compensation because they do not pursue their claims.44
Even some tort victims who are not categorically prevented from pursuing their
claims by economic or informational constraints fail to do so; perhaps concluding
the discounted expected value of the claim is less than the expected cost of
prosecuting it. Presumably, there is also a swathe of claims not brought simply
because the tort victim is unaware of her ability to recover, and/or because she
cannot afford the expected cost of prosecution. Competing claim purchasers would
have a market incentive to provide tort victims with information about their legal
rights to pursue compensation as part of the solicitation process. Furthermore, tort
victims currently precluded from compensation by economic constraints would be
able to immediately monetize their claim by selling it to a claim purchaser.
Marketization can potentially reduce or eliminate these barriers to compensation for
tort victims.
2.

Deterrence

A second argument commonly deployed by proponents of marketization is
that facilitating the prosecution of tort claims deters tortfeasors from engaging in
inefficient levels of risky activity.45 In an idealized free market analysis, parties who
engage in risky activity are deterred from engaging in marginally inefficient levels of
activity by the imposition of the costs of liability on those parties best able to
prevent the harm.46 The effectiveness of the deterrence relies on the consistent
enforcement of the liability rules. As noted above, many tort claims are never
prosecuted for a variety of reasons. Marketization of personal injury tort claims
would increase the total number of meritorious claims that are successfully
prosecuted, which in turn should incentivize parties engaging in risky activity to do

43. Shukaitis, supra note 8, at 337. See also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974), for a broader discussion
of how regular litigants (“repeat players”) interact differently with legal mechanisms than the typical
“one shot” tort victim.
44. See Marc A. Franklin, Robert H. Chanin & Irving Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A
Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1961).
45. See Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 671 (1975), for an
explanation of how one goal of the tort system is to minimize both accident costs and accident
prevention costs through “optimal deterrence.”
46. For an analysis of which rules provide optimal deterrence in a given case, see Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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so only when it is optimal. Proponents typically consider this a socially beneficial
side-effect, or positive externality, of marketization.
3.

Judicial Economy

The third and final argument propounded by proponents of marketization
that I will discuss is how marketization would affect judicial economy. One
hypothesis is that marketization will increase the number of cases that settle before
trial. The logic is simple: as discussed above, claim purchasers should have relatively
higher bargaining power than tort victims. When there is parity in bargaining power
between parties in a lawsuit, pre-trial settlement becomes substantially more
probable. An assignee or purchaser of a tort claim who has a superior bargaining
position will thus be able to demand a more efficient settlement price than the
typical tort victim.47
Judicial economy might also benefit because of a reduction in the number of
meritless claims being filed. The knowledgeable claim purchaser, driven by a profit
incentive, would not buy flimsy claims. Doing so would simply be a bad investment.
The claim purchaser acts as a sort of market-mechanism gatekeeper for the judicial
system, only bringing those claims with a reasonable expectation of profitability and
informing tort victims holding meritless claims of their value by choosing not to
purchase them. A tort victim who is unable to find a buyer for their claim will be
unlikely to bring it themselves since they are more aware of their odds of success.
A final argument in favor of judicial economy is that marketization would
resolve conflicts of interest inherent to contingency fee and hourly fee arrangements
that inhibit settlement.48 Neither contingency fees nor hourly fees perfectly motivate
an attorney to act in the tort victim’s economic interest.49 Transferring the right to
recovery to a claim purchaser essentially amounts to a 100% contingency fee
arrangement in exchange for a fixed sum. The claim purchaser may then hire an
attorney to pursue his claim, but unlike the typical tort victim, the purchaser would
have the knowledge and expertise to efficiently direct the efforts of an hourly fee
attorney.50 Thus, marketization would improve the odds of settlement by more
efficiently aligning the incentives of the attorney representing the claim with the
holder of the claim. Proponents conclude the net effect of these mechanisms is to
improve judicial economy relative to the status quo.

47. Patrick T. Morgan, Unbundling Our Tort Rights: Assignability for Personal Injury and
Wrongful Death Claims, 66 MO. L. REV. 683, 704 (2001).
48. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987).
49. Shukaitis, supra note 8, at 338–39 (explaining how fully shifting recovery rights from a tort
victim to a claim purchaser eliminates any misalignment of incentives between the tort victim and the
purchaser).
50. Id. at 340.
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THE CASE AGAINST MARKETIZATION
Opposition to the assignability of personal injury tort claims51 has been
vigorous. Contrary to the proponents, opponents contend marketization would
harm tort victims, increase burdens on the judiciary, be offensive to society, and be
impossible to implement.
1.

Harm to Tort Victims

Opponents of marketization contend a tort victim would receive less
compensation if she were able to sell her claim.52 The unsophisticated tort victim,
having no concept of the value of her claim, is vulnerable to being coerced into
selling it too cheaply. The claim purchaser, whose profit is derived from the
difference between the price paid for a claim and its true value,53 has every incentive
to pay as little as possible for the claim. The “quick-talking purchaser” could apply
high-pressure tactics to close a sale before the tort victim could understand the value
of her claim or to negotiate with other claim purchasers to determine the
competitive market price.54
Another reason opponents offer for how marketization will reduce
compensation for tort victims is that a claim purchaser would be unable to capture
the sympathy of a jury in the same way as a true tort victim.55 Because the claim
purchaser would not be able to recover as much as the true victim, and because the
claim purchaser has an incentive to pay the true victim as little as possible, the total
compensation tort victims receive would be reduced. Another way opponents claim
marketization would harm tort victims is that it would increase undesirable

51. Although personal injury tort claims remain unassignable in many American jurisdictions,
and markets for torts are restricted in them all, the historical trend has been toward allowing the
assignability of claims previously held to be inalienable such that the contemporary default position is
that a claim is considered assignable unless its assignment is expressly prohibited. Most jurisdictions,
where assignability of personal injury tort claims is prohibited, determining the assignability of such
claims is contrary to public policy. E.g., Webb v. Gittlen, 174 P.3d 275, 277 (Ariz. 2008). For a brief
discussion of the history of assignability trends in American jurisprudence, see Jennifer K. McDannell,
Assignability of Legal Malpractice Claims, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 141, 144–48 (1997). See also
6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 7 (“there is a general right to assign common law and statutory rights unless
there is an express prohibition in a statute or a showing that an assignment would clearly offend an
identifiable public policy”).
52. Radin, supra note 4, at 55.
53. I assume the true value of a claim is the amount awarded to the claimant by a trial on the
merits. In an actual tort market, most claims would be liquidated for an amount other than the true
value because parties will settle much more frequently than they will demand a trial on the merits. Thus,
a claims purchaser’s profit in most cases will in fact be derived from the difference between the price
paid by the seller and the price (settlement) paid by the defendant. A claim purchaser’s willingness to
pay (or a defendant’s willingness to settle) is primarily a function of their assessment of the claim’s true
value.
54. Shukaitis, supra note 8, at 347.
55. See S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. v. Wright Oil Co., 454 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Ark. 1970) (“[T]he
considerations urged to a jury in a personal injury case are of such a personal nature that an assignee
cannot urge them with equal force.”)
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harassment.56 Personal injury tort victims are in a uniquely vulnerable position
because of their recent tragedy or loss. Opponents argue that subjecting victims to
the harassing solicitations of professional claim purchasers is simply inhumane.
2.

Judicial Economy

Opponents of marketization also reach a contrary conclusion on the issue of
judicial economy. They contend allowing a market for torts would increase both the
volume and duration of litigation. This contention seems consistent with the
proponents’ claim that marketization would allow the prosecution of many claims
which are precluded from prosecution in the status quo. A similar contention is that
settlement will be reduced precisely because a risk-neutral professional claim
purchaser will be more resistant to delay and therefore be unwilling to settle for as
low a price as the original tort victim.57
Beyond these potential increases in litigation from the effective
implementation of marketization, opponents argue claim purchasers would still
increase the volume of litigation compared to tort victims because they would flood
the courts with meritless claims.58 Concern over speculative claim purchasers
flooding the courts with meritless claims has strong historical roots59 that have
carried over into American jurisprudence.60 In fact, historical evidence indicates
these concerns are not completely unfounded.61
A secondary concern raised by opponents is that marketization of personal
injury tort claims would spur a flurry of litigation around the contracts between tort
victims and claim purchasers.62 Plaintiffs have a substantial incentive to dispute the
56. For further discussion of victim harassment and a critique of the contemporary ethical rules
governing how attorneys solicit tort victims, see Alexander Schwab, In Defense of Ambulance
Chasing: A Critique of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 603 (2011).
57. Proponents typically agree that a short-run effect of marketization will be an increase in the
volume of litigation but contend the long-run effect will be a net reduction. See Shukaitis, supra note 8,
at 343–44.
58. Such claims are also known as “nuisance suits.” The crux of the nuisance suit is that for
many defendants, the considerable time, expense, and possible publicity engendered by real world
litigation frequently make it more advantageous to settle a claim regardless of its true value. In an ideal,
costless judicial system, a defendant would never be willing to settle a groundless suit. The real judicial
system is neither ideal nor costless.
59. See Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 12 (Or. 1891) (quoting Lords Blackstone and Coke on the
dangers of involving disinterested parties in speculative litigation).
60. “The general purpose of the law against champerty and maintenance was to prevent
officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and contention by vexatious or speculative litigation,
which would disturb the peace of society, lead to corrupt practices, and pervert the remedial processes.”
S.J. Brooks, Champerty and Maintenance in the United States, 3 VA. L. REV. 421, 427 (1916) (quoting
Huber v. Johnson, 70 N.W. 806 (1897)).
61. See McCloskey v. San Antonio Traction Co., 192 S.W. 1116 (Tex. Ct. App. 1917); McCloskey
v. San Antonio Pub. Serv. Co., 51 S.W.2d 1088, 1088 (Tex. Ct. App. 1932) (finding there was
overwhelming evidence establishing that appellant had, for years, made a business of “trampling upon
the laws as to barratry in Texas”). For further discussion of McCloskey’s saga, see Shukaitis, supra note
8, at 342–43. For a similar story from Minnesota, see Brooks, supra note 60, at 426–32.
62. See Bond, supra note 2, at 1312.
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contract in the event of any unexpected windfall acquired by the claim purchaser.
Claim purchasers may also be induced to litigate against tort victims when their
assessment of a claim’s true value is made under false representations by the tort
victim.
3.

Undesirable Commodification63

One ground upon which the marketization of personal injury tort claims is
sometimes opposed is that it fosters undesirable commodification in a way that is
offensive to society.64 Some courts, when presented with the issue, simply
concluded that a market for torts offends public sentiment so gravely as to outweigh
any benefits it may otherwise create. For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
criticized the notion of a market for torts, opining that to allow such a market would
be to sanction “a profitable traffic in human pain and suffering.”65 A Kentucky
Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion while finding personal injury claims
unassignable, stating that to hold otherwise would “permit one’s pain and suffering
to become a matter of speculation.”66 Federal courts have been equally wary. As
one district court judge argued in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding:
In our view to allow such a claim, either by way of creditor’s bill or petition
in bankruptcy, to pass freely to one not directly involved in the pain and
suffering usually attendant upon such accidents would be to unfeelingly
minimize the extent to which the injured person is reduced, physically,
psychologically, and as to future earning capacity, by such accidents. This
Court, if it allowed such claims to pass freely in these ways, could be
encouraging a market in the pain and suffering of unfortunate persons and
the law neither does, nor should it, encourage so callous and barbaric a
practice.67
In short, the notion of visibly predicating the profitability of an industry on
the magnitude of human suffering tends to cause feelings of discomfort.

63. This argument against assignability is unrelated to the agreed-upon goals of the tort system
identified above because it relies on a determination that a market for torts is unacceptable regardless
of any net benefits it may create. Since there is no tradeoff to weigh, I do not address it in my application
of the comparative institutional analytic framework to the assignability of personal injury tort claims.
This should not be construed as a judgment that this argument is without merit.
64. For further discussion of socially undesirable commodification in the context of human
organs, see Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH
POL., POL’Y & L. 57 (1989).
65. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. v. Wright Oil Co., 454 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Ark. 1970)
66. Wittenauer v. Kaelin, 15 S.W.2d 461, 462 (1929).
67. In re Schmelzer, 350 F. Supp. 429, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
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Implementation Challenges68

Effectively implementing a market for personal injury tort claims presents
several unique challenges, including assuring participation of the victim and
resolving information asymmetries. Prosecuting a personal injury tort claim typically
requires the active participation of the victim throughout the proceeding.
Opponents of marketization argue this unique aspect of personal injury claims
undermines the feasibility of implementing a market for torts, because there is no
reasonable way to assure the participation of the victims after they have sold their
claims. A claim purchaser would need substantial cooperation from an unmotivated
tort victim to successfully prosecute the claim. The claim purchaser may also need
access to documents or confidential information that remains in the control of the
tort victim, beyond requiring her presence and testimony during the trial.
Personal injury claims also present unique information asymmetry problems.69
The critical issue here, when examined from either the perspective of the buyer or
seller of the claim, is how the true value of the claim is estimated. The tort victim
has access to information about the true value of the claim which the claim
purchaser does not. To exacerbate this problem, the tort victim has an incentive to
mislead the claim purchaser as to the true value of the claim so as to inflate its price.
Ironically, and inversely to the quick-talking claim purchaser discussed above,70 the
unsophisticated claim purchaser can be induced into purchasing an unmeritorious
claim for more than its true value, or at least at a price too high to defray the cost
of prosecuting the claim. Opponents of marketization conclude these problems
make implementing a market for personal injury claims prohibitively difficult.
THE NEED FOR COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The proponents of marketization assure us implementing a market for torts
would improve outcomes for tort victims, benefit society by deterring tortious
conduct, and reduce the burden of litigation on the judicial system. Opponents of
marketization insist the opposite: that implementing a market for torts would
diminish outcomes for tort victims, increase the burden of litigation on the judicial
system, and be an overall detriment to society. It is logically impossible for both
sides’ arguments to be true on all fronts. How can these arguments be reconciled?
The tension between proponents and opponents of the marketization of personal
68. It would be remiss of me to not acknowledge the proponents’ response to these arguments.
Proponents generally respond to the following arguments with one of two straightforward answers: 1)
the private parties can contract in a way that avoids the problem; or 2) market mechanisms will resolve
the problem. For a more detailed explanation of how specialized contracts or market mechanisms might
obviate the challenges for implementation discussed here, see Marcushamer, supra note 2, at 1600–04.
69. For a discussion of how information asymmetries affect the behavior of economic actors
within the context of settlement negotiations, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under
Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984).
70. Although the seller’s perspective (the problem of the quick-talking claims purchaser) is
addressed in the section discussing potential harm to tort victims, it is also a problem of information
asymmetry.
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injury tort claims reflects a more fundamental malfunction: a failure by each to
engage in comparative institutional analysis. “In a world of institutional alternatives
that are both complex and imperfect, institutional choice by implication, simple
intuition, or even long lists of imperfections is deeply inadequate.”71 Rather than a
simple recitation of the inadequacies of assignability, or the extolling of its virtues,
the policy must be weighed against the relative merits of the available alternative
institutions in each instance before any conclusions may be reached as to its
desirability. What follows is an attempt to weigh the tradeoffs between assignability
and non-assignability by examining the dynamics of participation between
hypothetical claim purchasers and tort victims represented by attorneys.72
1.

Tradeoffs for Victims

The effect of assignability on the amount of compensation received by tort
victims is the most contentious and salient consideration in this debate. If one rule
clearly outstrips the other on this point, it will be determinative for many as to the
preferable public policy. It is for this reason that the bulk of my analysis will focus
on the effect on tort victims’ compensation under each institutional arrangement. I
proceed by comparing each purported effect of assignability on victims’
compensation asserted by opponents and proponents to the relative merits of the
alternative institution.
a.

Risk Aversion and Time Sensitivity

Variation in risk aversion between a given tortfeasor and the party prosecuting
a claim against it skews the liquidated value of a claim away from the true value of
the claim because, ceteris paribus, the parties will make different assessments of the
claim’s true value. Proponents contend the risk-averse tort victim is at a structural
disadvantage when pitted against the corporate defendant, and the commercial
claim purchaser will be less risk averse and bargain more effectively with the
tortfeasor.73 From a comparative perspective, this purported benefit of assignability
is tempered by the ways attorneys share the risk of litigation and buoy the risk
aversion of tort victims. Contingent fee arrangements shift some risk from the
victim to the attorney, who will only receive fees in the event a settlement or
judgement is reached. Furthermore, personal injury attorneys will typically advance
the non-fee costs of litigation without interest. As a technical matter, clients are
ultimately responsible for these costs, but in practice, attorneys rarely pursue

71. KOMESAR, supra note 10, at 6.
72. This analysis itself is inherently inadequate for determining the institution best suited for the
achievement of the agreed-upon goals of the tort system because it fails to consider all the available
institutional alternatives. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 2, at 555. It merely seeks to show whether
assignability is less well suited for the achievement of the agreed-upon goals of the tort system than nonassignability.
73. The widespread use of liability insurance makes it so that a tortfeasors liability is much more
likely to be assumed by a corporate defendant regardless of the identity of the tortfeasor.
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repayment from their clients if they are unable to settle the claim or acquire a
judgment. Without quantifying these effects, it is difficult to conclude that the
marginal reduction in risk aversion would measurably increase the ultimate value of
the claim, and therefore the compensation received by the victim.
The issue of time sensitivity produces a different result. Increased time
sensitivity reduces bargaining power in the context of tort claims. As discussed
above, tortfeasors are not only insensitive to time, but are in fact categorically
benefitted by delay.74 A contingent fee arrangement does little to alleviate the
immediate financial needs of a tort victim. The availability of health and
unemployment insurance mitigate this need, but immediate payment from a claim
purchaser would serve this need more effectively.
b.

Transaction Costs

The commercial claim purchaser would probably have some advantages over
a personal injury attorney in terms of transaction costs, but the likely benefit to the
tort victim is mixed. The purchaser’s ability to hold a diversified portfolio of claims
does not clearly outweigh the ability of a law firm to do the same.75 The same is
true for the purported advantage held by a claim purchaser in assessing the value of
tort claims. The expert knowledge needed to value such a claim is precisely the sort
of knowledge held by plaintiff-side attorneys. The purported benefits from
economies of scale also would seem to inure as easily to the attorney as they would
to the claim purchaser. The ability of a purchaser to selectively pursue more
profitable claims is only superior to an attorney’s ability to do so if the assessment
of the claim’s profitability changes after the beginning of the attorney-client
relationship. Prior to the formation of this relationship, attorneys can sort out those
claims which they consider to be a waste of time as easily as a claim purchaser
would.76 The primary advantage a claim purchaser would have over firms in terms
of transaction costs occur in cases where the purchaser holds several claims against
a single defendant.77 Since the claim purchaser, unlike an attorney, would not have
an ethical obligation to pursue each claim individually, they would be able to settle
bundles of claims at a discount. Finally, although it may be obviated by clever
contracts, it would seem the need for the continued participation of the tort victim
in most suits will create substantial transaction costs for claim purchasers.

74. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
75. “[A]s contingent fee lawyers, we are in the business of managing portfolio risk.” David
A. Hyman, Bernard Black & Charles Silver, The Economics of Plaintiff-Side Personal Injury Practice, 2015
U. ILL. L. REV. 1563, 1593 (2015) (quoting Bill Daniels, Ten Tips for Making Partner in a Plaintiff’s
Firm, PRACTICAL PRACTITIONER ( July 2007)).
76. In fact, firms appear to do exactly that. Firms reject significant numbers of potential clients
at the first consultation, and substantial numbers of cases that make it through the first screening do
not result in representation. In medical malpractice cases, research shows attorneys accept less than
10% of initial inquiries. Id. at 1594.
77. See Marcushamer, supra note 2, at 1580 and accompanying text.
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Access to Compensation

It is well recognized that many tort victims never receive compensation
because, for a variety of reasons, they do not pursue their claim.78 How assignability
makes it easier for currently precluded victims to receive compensation is less clear.
Some victims who do not pursue claims are unaware of their right to compensation.
Proponents identify correctly that a claim purchaser has a market incentive to
provide information to potential victims about their right to compensation but fail
to articulate how advertising by plaintiff-side attorneys is any worse at doing so.
Some tort victims, particularly those who are extremely time sensitive, would
benefit from the ability to immediately monetize their claim. However, it is unclear
how immediate monetization allows previously uncompensated victims to become
compensated since the claims which are most likely to be immediately monetized
are also those claims most likely to be eventually compensated through
representation by an attorney.79
d.

Harm to Victims80

As noted by the opponents, irrevocable assignment of the entire interest in a
claim presents a serious risk of the tort victim being swindled. The claim purchaser
will have every incentive to acquire the interest in the claim for as little as possible.
Furthermore, shifting all the risk of failure to the claim purchaser means the victim
will receive a reciprocally reduced amount of compensation. Finally, the tendency
for a claim’s true value to be obscured at the outset places downward pressure on
the claim purchaser’s willingness to pay, even under competitive market conditions.
The net effect on total compensation will depend on the magnitude of any
efficiency gains from reduced transaction costs outweighing the downward pressure
from the shifted risk and information barriers.
2.

Tradeoffs for Society

The primary social benefit proponents claim from a market for torts is that it
will help deter tortfeasors from engaging in inefficient levels of risky activity. Tort
liability for personal injury claims already has a limited deterrent effect.81 To increase
socially beneficial deterrence, it is not enough to simply increase the number of
claims brought. Rather, there must be an increase in the number of meritorious claims
brought. Insofar as meritorious claims that are unable to be prosecuted under nonassignability will be brought by commercial claim purchasers, there will be a socially
78. See Sugarman, supra note 2, at 592–94.
79. “Quite commonly, albeit not always, institutions move together. When one institution is at
its best or worst, the alternative institutions are often at their best or worst.” KOMESAR, supra note 10,
at 23.
80. I do not discuss the potential for victim harassment in this section because it does not
implicate compensation. Suffice it to say, I see no reason to conclude harassment from a claims
purchaser would occur at a rate different than harassment from a personal injury attorney.
81. See KOMESAR, supra note 10, at 165.
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beneficial increase in deterrence. As discussed above, this conclusion is not clearly
established. Furthermore, insofar as assignability might increase the number of
unmeritorious claims brought, it will create inefficient levels of deterrence. In cases
where a single tortfeasor has injured several victims, a claim purchaser may have
relatively less incentive than an attorney to ensure the individual claims are
meritorious in the hope that the defendant will settle bad claims along with the good
as part of a bundled settlement.82
3.

Tradeoffs for Judicial Economy

Assignability is unlikely to benefit judicial economy. Proponents correctly
state that assignability could increase the odds of settlement by increasing bargaining
power parity between the parties to litigation. Where a claim purchaser has
bargaining power that is superior to that of the victim represented by an attorney,
it will increase the odds of settlement. Whether this would in fact occur is unclear.83
The more likely way that assignability would benefit judicial economy is through
the resolution of the conflicts of interest inherent to contingency fee and hourly fee
arrangements that inhibit settlement.84 However, these gains are more than likely to
be offset by litigation surrounding the assignment contracts. As observed by the
opponents, plaintiffs have a substantial incentive to dispute the contract in the event
of an unexpected windfall, such as a bad faith insurance claim. The complex
contracts used to ensure the continued participation of tort victims will also produce
litigation that will weigh against any gains from assignability.
CONCLUSION
The theoretical conclusions I have reached here cannot be treated as
definitive. Rather, it is my hope that this Note provides the framework to guide
further empirical analysis assessing the real-world impacts of the tradeoffs I have
identified. The true effect on compensation cannot be known without quantifying
how the increased efficiencies potentially enjoyed by a claim purchaser compare to
the downward pressure of shifted risk and information barriers on assignment price.
The true effect on deterrence cannot be known without quantifying how
assignability affects the number and merit of claims brought. The true effect on
judicial economy cannot be known without quantifying how the increased odds of
settlement compare to the increased volume of litigation surrounding assignment
contracts. Without a more searching examination of these questions, we remain in
the dark as to whether assignability is truly preferable to non-assignability for

82. See Marcushamer, supra note 2, at 1580.
83. One proponent concludes “[t]hat the assignee would have the superior bargaining position
is an economic observation. An assignee would not purchase a claim from a tort victim if the former
could not ‘get a better return’ on the claim. In other words, no one knowingly bets on a
losing team.” Morgan, supra note 47, at 704 n.180. The key word in this statement is “knowingly.”
84. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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personal injury tort claims, let alone whether a market for torts is superior to the
panoply of institutional alternatives.

